Watson v. Philip Morris

In this class action against a cigarette manufacturer in an Arkansas state court under Arkansas state business practices laws, plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer had misled consumers by deceptively manipulating its "lights" cigarettes to register a lower content of tar and nicotine on the Cambridge Filter Method (CFM) test than that actually consumed by smokers when using its product.  The defendant moved to remove the case to federal court, arguing that because the Federal Trade Commission had approved the CFM as a manner of testing cigarette content, the manufacturer "act[ed] under" an "agency" or "officer" of the United States when testing cigarettes using the CFM, thus fulfilling the conditions for removal detailed in federal statutory law.  The Court held that removal was improper, finding that the language of the statute required not merely complying with administrative regulations but "assist[ing]" with or "carry[ing] out" the implementation of the law.

Watson, et al. v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., et al., 551 U.S. 142, Supreme Court of the United States (2007).

  • United States
  • Jun 11, 2007
  • Supreme Court of the United States

Parties

Plaintiff

  • Lisa Watson
  • Loretta Lawson
  • All others similarly situated

Defendant

  • Philip Morris Companies, Inc.
  • Others

Legislation Cited

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"Assuming this timeline, Philip Morris’ argument nonetheless contains a fatal flaw—a flaw of omission. Although Philip Morris uses the word “delegation” or variations many times throughout its brief, we have found no evidence of any delegation of legal authority from the FTC to the industry association to undertake testing on the Government agency’s behalf. Nor is there evidence of any contract, any payment, any employer/employee relationship, or any principal/agent arrangement. We have examined all of the documents to which Philip Morris and certain supporting amici refer. Some of those documents refer to cigarette testing specifications, others refer to the FTC’s inspection and supervision of the industry laboratory’s testing, and still others refer to the FTC’s prohibition of statements in cigarette advertising. But none of these documents establish the type of formal delegation that might authorize Philip Morris to remove the case.... And, though we find considerable regulatory detail and supervision, we can find nothing that warrants treating the FTC/Philip Morris relationship as distinct from the usual regulator/regulated relationship. This relationship, as we have explained, cannot be construed as bringing Philip Morris within the terms of the statute."