This case arises out of a 1994 class action lawsuit brought by Florida smokers against major tobacco companies for damages caused by smoking (Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.). In this case, the court found that applying the first phase of findings from the Engle case to future lawsuits by former class members does not violate tobacco companies’ due process rights. The court found that the tobacco companies had full notice and opportunity to be heard in the year-long trial in the Engle case. In applying the Engle findings to future cases, the court ruled that the jury should be asked to determine (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class (i.e., they were addicted to the company’s cigarettes, which caused their injuries); (2) whether the tobacco companies’ conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury for each claim asserted (e.g., strict liability, negligence); and (3) whether the plaintiff was partially at fault.
An individual or organization may seek civil damages against a tobacco company based on the claim that the use of tobacco products causes disease or death. Some of these cases will relate to general tobacco products, while others will relate to specific subcategories of tobacco products--for example, light or low products, menthol or other flavored products. Additionally, there may be cases relating to exposure to secondhand smoke.
A violation of the right to procedural fairness. For example, a party may claim that a government agency did not consult with public or stakeholders when issuing regulations.
Any violation of a law designed to ensure fair trade, competition, or the free flow of truthful information in the marketplace. For example, a government may require businesses to disclose detailed information about products—particularly in areas where safety or public health is an issue.
The tobacco industry may have perpetrated a fraud upon the public or the courts by presenting false information or deliberately hiding known-facts.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"This Court must determine whether Engle III, Martin, and Jimmie Lee Brown combine to deny Defendants their constitutional due process rights. Defendants had full notice and opportunity to be heard in the year-long trial of Phase I of the Engle case. Special jury findings that individually addressed each Defendant's conduct went against the Defendants. The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Engle III(as implemented by Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown) to give those Phase I findings "res judicata" effect for future cases was a constitutionally permissible application of Florida issue preclusion law in these sui generis cases. "We must bear in mind that no single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process Clause. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483, 102 S.Ct. 1883 (citations and quotations omitted). Defendants' due process rights are not being violated."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
This case arises out of a 1994 class action lawsuit brought by Florida smokers against major tobacco companies for damages caused by smoking (Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.). In this case, the court found that applying the first phase of findings from the Engle case to future lawsuits by former class members does not violate tobacco companies’ due process rights. The court found that the tobacco companies had full notice and opportunity to be heard in the year-long trial in the Engle case. In applying the Engle findings to future cases, the court ruled that the jury should be asked to determine (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class (i.e., they were addicted to the company’s cigarettes, which caused their injuries); (2) whether the tobacco companies’ conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury for each claim asserted (e.g., strict liability, negligence); and (3) whether the plaintiff was partially at fault.