Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.

A group of smokers filed a class action against Philip Morris alleging that the company’s marketing of “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” cigarettes violated certain fraud statutes. The trial court denied the company’s attempt to dismiss the case and awarded the smokers $10.1 billion. After numerous appeals, an Illinois court reinstated the case in 2014. In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appeals court’s decision (based on procedural reasons) and dismissed the class action, effectively ending the case.  

Price, et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2015 IL 117687 (2015).

  • United States
  • Nov 4, 2015
  • Supreme Court of Illinois

Parties

Plaintiff

  • Michael Fruth, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
  • Sharon Price, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Defendant Philip Morris, Inc.

Legislation Cited

Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"Indeed, defendant has already been found liable in another jurisdiction for committing the same misconduct. In United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (Philip Morris), the federal government sued defendant and other major tobacco companies in 1999 pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994)). The government charged that the tobacco companies violated the RICO statute by intentionally conspiring to deceive the American public regarding the health effects of smoking cigarettes through their marketing practices. As summarized by the court of appeals, the government alleged that the defendants fraudulently denied that smoking causes cancer and emphysema, that secondhand smoke causes lung cancer and endangers children, that nicotine is an addictive drug and the defendants manipulated it to sustain addiction, that light and low-tar cigarettes are not less harmful than regular cigarettes, and that the defendants intentionally marketed to youth. The government also alleged that the defendants concealed evidence and destroyed documents to hide the dangers of smoking and protect themselves in litigation. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1106 (citing 449 F. Supp. 2d at 27)."
"In the context of this recognized public health epidemic, defendant’s misconduct was appalling. The circuit court’s findings in the original trial, which no reviewing court has disturbed, were supported by the following evidence. defendant’s own scientists did not believe that “light” cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine to human smokers as opposed to testing machines. Defendant concealed this knowledge from the public and the health community. Further, when defendant’s secret tests showed that “light” cigarettes produced tar that was higher in toxic substances and more mutagenic than the tar from regular cigarettes, defendant shut down its secret testing, concealed the test results, and continued to market its “light” cigarettes as a healthier alternative to regular cigarettes. Price v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 00-L-112 ¶¶ 55-58, 64-66, 70-74 (Cir. Ct. Madison Co.). The circuit court found as follows. There was no credible evidence to support defendant’s representations that Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights delivered lower tar and nicotine or were safer than regular Marlboros. Evidence supported the conclusion that Lights were actually more harmful and hazardous than their regular counterparts. Moreover, defendant was aware of the increased harm from these light cigarettes based on its own scientific testing. Despite this knowledge, defendant perpetuated and nurtured the false perception of “healthier smoking,” which led existing smokers to delay quitting, and motivated more nonsmokers to begin smoking. Id. ¶¶ 69-70."
"In this case, whether the prayer in plaintiffs’ section 2-1401 petition “to vacate the final judgment” is viewed as a request to the circuit court to vacate the December 15, 2005, judgment of this court, or a request to vacate the December 18, 2006, dismissal order on the merits, the result is the same: the circuit court was asked to do something it does not have the authority to do—vacate a judgment of a higher court. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in considering the merits of plaintiffs’ section 2-1401 petition. As relief was unavailable under that provision, the petition should have been dismissed. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8 (a section 2-1401 petition is subject to dismissal if, “ ‘on its face, it shows that the petitioner is not entitled to relief’ ” (quoting Klein v. La Salle National Bank, 155 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1993))). We therefore vacate the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts and dismiss this cause of action."