United States v. Philip Morris USA, et al.

In 1999, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the major cigarette manufacturers and related trade organizations alleging that defendants, while acting as an enterprise, fraudulently misled American consumers for decades about the risks and dangers of cigarette smoking and exposure to secondhand smoke in violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In 2006, the court found that defendants violated civil provisions of RICO and that there was a reasonable likelihood that defendants would continue to violate RICO in the future. On appeal, the district court’s findings were upheld, in part, vacated, in part, and remanded, in part, to the district court. After the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear appeals from both sides in the case in June 2010, the district court began to implement the 2006 final order.

This opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviews the District Court’s previous order regarding the clarification of an injunction requiring the defendants to report marketing data.  The defendants argued the previous order changed the reporting requirements of marketing data to effect a ‘modification’ of the initial injunction.  The appellate court held the order was a simple clarification and not a ‘modification’ of the previous injunction, therefore there was no procedural ground for the defendants to further delay the reporting required by the initial injunction.

United States, United States Dept. of Justice, et al. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 11-5146, et al. (D.C. Cir. 2012).

  • United States
  • Jul 27, 2012
  • U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Parties

Plaintiff United States

Defendant

  • American Tobacco Company
  • Philip Morris USA Inc.

Legislation Cited

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"We recognize, as did the Birmingham Fire Fighters court, that a district court’s interpretation of an injunction could conceivably be so “blatantly or obviously wrong” that it amounts to a modification. Id. But we further agree with the Birmingham Fire Fighters and Gautreaux courts that if the order does not either by its terms or by the court’s blatant or obvious misinterpretation of the injunction effect such a change in relationship, then it is not a modification, and we do not have jurisdiction over the attempted interlocutory appeal."