U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York
After the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act by the U.S. government in 2009, Plaintiff tobacco companies challenged a New York City law prohibiting the sale of “any flavored tobacco product except in a tobacco bar.” The law did not include cigarettes or flavors of tobacco, menthol, mint or wintergreen. Plaintiffs asserted the New York City law was preempted by the federal act and was thus invalid. This opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was delivered after the trial court ruled against the plaintiffs on summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued the New York law was a “veiled attempt to regulate the manufacture of tobacco products” instead of a restriction on the retail sale of products with a specific characteristic. The court held the law fit within the federal law because it invoked powers reserved for states and fell within the federal laws exemption clause for preemption that allowed states to enact laws restricting retail sales. The court thus affirmed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal.
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co., et al. v. City of New York, 11-5167-cv (2d Cir. 2013).
Tobacco companies or front groups may challenge any legislative or regulatory measure that affects their business interests. Unlike public interest litigation, these cases seek to weaken health measures. These cases frequently involve the industry proceeding against the government. For example, a group of restaurant owners challenging a smoke free law as unconstitutional.
Measures restricting tobacco sales to or by minors, as well as other retail restrictions relating to point-of-sale, candy and toys resembling tobacco products, vending machines, or free distribution.
(See FCTC Art. 16)
A violation of the right to carry on trade, business, or profession of a person’s choice. This right may also be called the right to free enterprise or economic freedom. The industry may argue that a business should be able to conduct its business without government regulation, including whether or not to be smoke free.
The subject matter of the case should be dealt with at a state level or national level.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"We are mindful that the limitations imposed by the ordinance as described by appellants are very strict; in another context, their proximity to a ban might concern us. However, given Congress’s explicit decision to preserve for the states a robust role in regulating, and even banning, sales of tobacco products, we adopt a broad reading of the saving clause and a limited view of the kinds of restrictions that would constitute a ban and require us to address the permissibility of outright prohibitions under the saving clause. This interpretation of § 916 both follows from its plain language and comports with the FSPTCA’s overall objectives. Cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872 (2000) (declining to interpret a saving provision to allow state law to directly conflict with the statute’s purposes and so “permit[ the federal law] to defeat its own objectives”). The City’s restriction on the sale of flavored tobacco products advances the FSPTCA’s objective of reducing the use and harmfulness of tobacco products, especially among young people, see FSPTCA § 3(2), 21 U.S.C. § 387 note, without trenching on Congress’s competing goal of keeping tobacco products generally available to addicted adults. It regulates a niche product, not a broad category of products such as cigarettes or smokeless tobacco, and it allows that product to be sold within New York City, although to a limited extent."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
After the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act by the U.S. government in 2009, Plaintiff tobacco companies challenged a New York City law prohibiting the sale of “any flavored tobacco product except in a tobacco bar.” The law did not include cigarettes or flavors of tobacco, menthol, mint or wintergreen. Plaintiffs asserted the New York City law was preempted by the federal act and was thus invalid. This opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was delivered after the trial court ruled against the plaintiffs on summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued the New York law was a “veiled attempt to regulate the manufacture of tobacco products” instead of a restriction on the retail sale of products with a specific characteristic. The court held the law fit within the federal law because it invoked powers reserved for states and fell within the federal laws exemption clause for preemption that allowed states to enact laws restricting retail sales. The court thus affirmed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal.