Four bars challenged the validity of a municipal smoke-free law, claiming the law violated the state and federal constitutions. The law prohibited proprietors and employers from allowing smoking in public places and places of employment, specifically exempting smoking within private members-only clubs, and required proprietors and employers to publicize smoking regulations. The Court held that the ordinance did not conflict with state law, was not unconstitutionally vague, did not infringe upon the plaintiffs' due process rights, and did not violate equal protection of the law. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the defendants.
Traditions Tavern, et al. v. Columbus, 171 Ohio App. 3d 383, Ohio-6655, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth Appellate District (2006).
United States
Dec 14, 2006
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth Appellate District
Tobacco companies or front groups may challenge any legislative or regulatory measure that affects their business interests. Unlike public interest litigation, these cases seek to weaken health measures. These cases frequently involve the industry proceeding against the government. For example, a group of restaurant owners challenging a smoke free law as unconstitutional.
A violation of the right to equal protection under the law, or another form of discrimination. The industry may claim that regulations discriminate against tobacco companies or tobacco products. Smokers may claim that addiction is a health condition, so regulations discriminate against them based on their health condition. Facilities subject to smoke free laws may claim that smoke free (SF) exceptions (e.g., hotel rooms, mental hospitals, etc.) unfairly discriminate against SF businesses because the law should apply to all locations equally.
A violation of the right to procedural fairness. For example, a party may claim that a government agency did not consult with public or stakeholders when issuing regulations.
The subject matter of the case should be dealt with at a state level or national level.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"A statute that provides for the identification and enforcement of no-smoking areas within places of public assembly does not amount to a comprehensive law completely forbidding or permitting smoking inside enclosed public areas. At no point does R.C. 3791.031 provide that smoking must be permitted within places of public assembly. Nor does the statute completely prohibit smoking within public places, although it does allow that the "no smoking area may include the entire place of public assembly." R.C. 3791.031(B). Moreover, the statute does not pertain to all enclosed public spaces. Instead, it applies only to those public places that fall within its definition of a "place of public assembly."4 Conspicuously absent from that definition are the very type of establishments appellants represent. Other examples of enclosed public buildings that are not addressed by R.C. 3791.031 are retail stores, gas stations, and small private businesses. Thus, even if R.C. 3791.031 qualifies as a general law regulating indoor smoking, we could not find that the Columbus smoking ban is in conflict with the statute."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
Four bars challenged the validity of a municipal smoke-free law, claiming the law violated the state and federal constitutions. The law prohibited proprietors and employers from allowing smoking in public places and places of employment, specifically exempting smoking within private members-only clubs, and required proprietors and employers to publicize smoking regulations. The Court held that the ordinance did not conflict with state law, was not unconstitutionally vague, did not infringe upon the plaintiffs' due process rights, and did not violate equal protection of the law. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the defendants.