The state of Oregon sought to enjoin the owner of a retail business operated on Seneca Nation tribal lands in New York state from selling certain types of cigarettes to consumers in Oregon via internet websites. The state argued that the owner had failed to comply with an Oregon law prohibiting the in-state sale of certain cigarette brands. Upon appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment for the state. The Court held that the state court possessed subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the nature of the owner's business dealings with consumers in Oregon stretched beyond the borders of the Seneca tribal territory and into the state. The Court further held that the statute applied to the defendant's activities and that the statute did not violate the federal constitution's commerce clause.
State of Oregon, et al. v. Maybee, 232 P.3d 970, Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon (2010).
Government, through its agencies and officials including prosecutors, may seek to enforce its health laws. For example, the government may revoke the license of a retailer that sells tobacco products to minors. These cases may also directly involve the tobacco industry, for example, a government might impound and destroy improperly labeled cigarette packs.
The subject matter of the case should be dealt with at a state level or national level.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"By invoking the Commerce Clause, defendant argues that the Complementary Act unduly interferes with Congress's constitutional authority to regulate commerce among the several states, even though Congress has not enacted any law with which the state statute conflicts. In other words, defendant advances a so-called "dormant Commerce Clause" argument. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US 69, 107 S Ct 1637, 95 L Ed 2d 67 (1987). Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is enormously complex and controversial. In essence, state laws may not overtly discriminate against out-of-state interests; they may not operate so as to protect in-state economic interests from out-of-state competition; and, even if they are facially neutral and neutral in operation, they must not impose a burden on interstate commerce that is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US 137, 142, 90 S Ct 844, 25 L Ed 2d 174 (1970). The Complementary Act is nondiscriminatory; it applies with equal force to in-state and out-of-state persons who sell, offer for sale, or possess for sale in this state, unlisted cigarettes. It is not protectionist; no Oregon sellers or manufacturers receive an economic benefit from its operation. And the state interest at stake, public health, is weighty, while the burden on interstate commerce is minimal, in light of the fact that 46 other states have similar statutes. Further, defendant's perfunctory argument under the dormant Commerce Clause relies entirely on one case, S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery, 443 F Supp 2d 313, 319-20 (EDNY 2006), which stands for the unremarkable proposition that a state may not regulate economic transactions that occur entirely out-of-state. That is not what occurs under the Complementary Act."
"Finally, even if we were to agree with defendant that his sales of cigarettes do not occur "in this state," we would nonetheless conclude that his activities violate ORS 180.440(1)(b). That statute makes it unlawful for a person to sell or "offer for sale" an unlisted brand in this state. While defendant can make a plausible (albeit ultimately unconvincing) argument that the sale occurs when he receives the payment and ships the product in New York, the same cannot be said for his argument that the offer occurs in New York. If defendant's offer did not extend beyond the boundaries of New York, nobody in Oregon could accept it and Oregon would have nothing to regulate."
"That conclusion brings us to defendant's second argument: Even if ORS 180.440(1)(b) penalizes the sale of unstamped cigarettes in this state, the statute nonetheless does not apply to him because the sales do not take place "in this state" as that phrase is used in ORS 180.440(1)(b).(2) We have already rejected the argument that, with respect to subject matter jurisdiction, defendant's activities took place entirely on the Seneca reservation and did not reach into Oregon. The same reasoning applies to defendant's argument that the statutory term "in this state" does not capture his sales activities. His offer reaches into this state, the offer is accepted here, and the final act of the transaction, receipt of the product, occurs here. The context within which ORS 180.440(1)(b) occurs supplies additional reasons to reject defendant's statutory interpretation argument."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
The state of Oregon sought to enjoin the owner of a retail business operated on Seneca Nation tribal lands in New York state from selling certain types of cigarettes to consumers in Oregon via internet websites. The state argued that the owner had failed to comply with an Oregon law prohibiting the in-state sale of certain cigarette brands. Upon appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment for the state. The Court held that the state court possessed subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the nature of the owner's business dealings with consumers in Oregon stretched beyond the borders of the Seneca tribal territory and into the state. The Court further held that the statute applied to the defendant's activities and that the statute did not violate the federal constitution's commerce clause.