"It is true that the definition of the word “display” in s 53 of the Act is a merely inclusive definition and in the absence of any relevant definition in a statute of a word used in the statute, the ordinary meaning of the word would be likely to apply. However, in the present case, as was submitted by counsel for the plaintiff, the legislature, by prohibiting in s 61B the displaying of a tobacco advertisement and by including “audible message” in the definition of “tobacco advertisement” in s 53, has itself indicated that the word “display” in the Act is not to be interpreted as limited to its ordinary meaning. Once it is accepted that an audible message is capable of being “displayed” within the meaning of the word as used in the Act, I do not consider that there is any warrant for limiting the display of an audible message to a display which has some degree of permanency. Obviously, if such a requirement was adopted, difficult questions would be likely to arise as to whether a particular display had the requisite degree of permanency or was too transient to amount to a display within the meaning of the word in the Act. Unlike the word “display”, the expression “tobacco advertisement” is defined exhaustively in the Act. The definition includes “any … audible message … that gives publicity to or otherwise promotes or is intended to promote (a) the purchase or use of a tobacco product”. What was said by the sales person in each case falls squarely within the definition. As in the case of the word “display”, there is, in my opinion, no warrant for requiring what was said to have some degree of permanency before it could fall within the definition."