Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.

The plaintiffs, smokers, filed a class action against Philip Morris alleging that defendant's marketing of light and low-tar and nicotine cigarettes violated certain fraud statutes.  The trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment and awarded plaintiffs $10.1 billion. On appeal, the Court held that the action was barred by the Consumer Fraud Act and remanded with instructions for the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs' claim.

Price, et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, Supreme Court of Illinois (2005).

  • United States
  • Dec 15, 2005
  • Supreme Court of Illinois

Parties

Plaintiff

  • Others
  • Sharon Price

Defendant Philip Morris, Inc.

Legislation Cited

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"The result that the special concurrence advocates is, at best, surprising. PMUSA misrepresented the qualities of its light cigarettes. The misrepresentations led cigarette consumers to overcome their aversion to the taste of light cigarettes and purchase light cigarettes in an unsuccessful attempt to lower their intake of the harmful products to which they were exposed in smoking cigarettes. While PMUSA saw its profits increase because of the sale of light cigarettes, cigarette consumers did not receive the health benefits for which they bargained. The special concurrence dispenses with the inequities in the transaction, however. So long as the price the consumers paid for the false light cigarettes was no more than the price for the nonbargained-for cigarettes, PMUSA could make misrepresentations of whatever kind it desired. When considered in light of the addictive nature of cigarettes, the special concurrence's position is not only surprising but untenable. Recall the special concurrence's acknowledgment that "PMUSA was fully aware[] the so-called `light' cigarettes not only offered no health benefits, but were actually more toxic." 219 Ill.2d at 276, 302 Ill.Dec. at 56, 848 N.E.2d at 56 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring, joined by Fitzgerald, J.). Also recall the special concurrence's claim that cigarette consumers could "not have stopped smoking, for they were addicted." 219 Ill.2d at 281, 302 Ill.Dec. at 58, 848 N.E.2d at 58 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring, joined by Fitzgerald, J.). The stepping-stones to the special concurrence's position are as follows. Cigarette manufacturers, including PMUSA, could market a highly addictive and toxic product, a cigarette, with the result that the consumer became addicted to the product. PMUSA could then market a light cigarette, just as addictive as a full-flavored cigarette, that it claimed contained less toxic compounds than a full-flavored cigarette. Consumers could flock to the light cigarette, believing the misrepresentations regarding the health benefits flowing from the claimed reduction of toxic compounds in the light cigarette. PMUSA could reap increased profits as customers switched to the light cigarette marketed by PMUSA. However, consumers could not recover for the misrepresentations because they could not break free of the addiction directly flowing from PMUSA's marketing of full-flavored and light cigarettes."
"Because PMUSA was specifically authorized to use the disputed terms without fear of the FTC challenging them as deceptive or unfair, it is exempt from civil liability under 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act for the use of the terms so long as the other conditions set out in the consent orders were met. We find no evidence in the record that PMUSA failed to use these terms in compliance with the terms of the consent orders."