Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.

Plaintiffs, two individuals and a certified class of persons, claimed that they were harmed by Philip Morris, Inc.’s alleged violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act by its use of "false and fraudulent" marketing practices for its tobacco products.  Philip Morris denied the allegations, but the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, awarded the plaintiffs compensation and punitive damages totaling $10.1 billion. The Circuit Court set the amount of an appeal bond at $12 billion but reduced it at Philip Morris’s request. Plaintiffs filed a motion to change the amount of the bond, arguing that the new amount would not be enough to cover the potential costs of appeal proceedings.  The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, concluded that a decision would require resolution of factual issues and sent the case back to the circuit court to determine the sufficiency of the appeal bond. 

Price, et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. App., 2003).

  • United States
  • Jul 14, 2003
  • Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District

Parties

Plaintiff

  • Others
  • Sharon Price

Defendant

  • Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran
  • Philip Morris, Inc.

Legislation Cited

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"Philip Morris next argues that the plaintiffs should be estopped from challenging the stay order because the plaintiffs represented to the Illinois Supreme Court that they were adequately protected by the present bond and stay when Philip Morris sought to bypass the appellate court. We have reviewed the record and find that this claim is unsupported. The plaintiffs acknowledged the existence of the bond and stay. We have not been directed to any portion of the record where the plaintiffs expressed satisfaction with the bond or accepted its sufficiency. Finally, Philip Morris argues that the United States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee its right to appeal. It claims that it cannot post a bond in conformity with Rule 305(a) and, therefore, its constitutional right to appeal has been violated. The claim is meritless. We addressed this matter earlier in this opinion and decline to rehash the matter. Suffice it to say that the right to a stay and the right to appeal are separate and independent. Philip Morris may appeal with or without a bond and with or without a stay. There is no constitutional deprivation. See Jack Spring, Inc., 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208"