Jesse Williams, represented by his widow, was a heavy cigarette smoker. He is suing Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro, the brand that Williams smoked, for negligence and deceit. A jury found that Williams' death was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smoking was safe. The jury ultimately found that Philip Morris negligent and had engaged in deceit. In respect to deceit, the claim at issue here, the jury awarded compensatory damages of about $821,000 along with $79.5 million in punitive damages.
The trial judge subsequently found the $79.5 million punitive damages award "excessive" and reduced it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled against Philip Morris, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the punitive damages. The Supreme Court remanded the decision and held that the punitive damages award was based in part on the jury's desire to punish the defendant for harming non-parties and amounted to a taking of property from the defendant without due process. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the existing award was constitutionally “grossly excessive.”
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 549 U. S. 346 (2007).
An individual or organization may seek civil damages against a tobacco company based on the claim that the use of tobacco products causes disease or death. Some of these cases will relate to general tobacco products, while others will relate to specific subcategories of tobacco products--for example, light or low products, menthol or other flavored products. Additionally, there may be cases relating to exposure to secondhand smoke.
A violation of the public’s right to information. The tobacco industry may claim that advertising, promotion or sponsorship, or packaging regulations limit the industry’s ability to communicate information to their customers and therefore infringes on the customer’s right to receive information, and to distinguish one product from another. Alternatively, public health advocates may claim that tobacco industry misinformation violates their right to accurate information or that government must be transparent in its dealings with the tobacco industry.
A violation of the right to procedural fairness. For example, a party may claim that a government agency did not consult with public or stakeholders when issuing regulations.
The court might consider procedural matters without touching the merits of the case. These might include: improper joinder, when third parties, such as Health NGOs or government officials, seek to become parties to the suit; lack of standing, where a plaintiff fails to meet the minimum requirements to bring suit; lack of personal jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction to rule over the defendant; or lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction over the issue at suit.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"Respondent argues that she is free to show harm to other victims because it is relevant to a different part of the punitive damages constitutional equation, namely, reprehensibility. That is to say, harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct. Philip Morris, in turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order to demonstrate reprehensibility. Nor do we. Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible—although counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others nonetheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse. Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties. Given the risks of unfairness that we have mentioned, it is constitutionally important for a court to provide assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong one. And given the risks of arbitrariness, the concern for adequate notice, and the risk that punitive damages awards can, in practice, impose one State's (or one jury's) policies (e.g., banning cigarettes) upon other States—all of which accompany awards that, today, may be many times the size of such awards in the 18th and 19th centuries, see id., at 594-595, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (BREYER, J., concurring)—it is particularly important that States avoid procedure that unnecessarily deprives juries of proper legal guidance. We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused strangers."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
Jesse Williams, represented by his widow, was a heavy cigarette smoker. He is suing Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro, the brand that Williams smoked, for negligence and deceit. A jury found that Williams' death was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smoking was safe. The jury ultimately found that Philip Morris negligent and had engaged in deceit. In respect to deceit, the claim at issue here, the jury awarded compensatory damages of about $821,000 along with $79.5 million in punitive damages.
The trial judge subsequently found the $79.5 million punitive damages award "excessive" and reduced it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled against Philip Morris, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the punitive damages. The Supreme Court remanded the decision and held that the punitive damages award was based in part on the jury's desire to punish the defendant for harming non-parties and amounted to a taking of property from the defendant without due process. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the existing award was constitutionally “grossly excessive.”