Philip Morris USA v. Williams

Jesse Williams, represented by his widow, was a heavy cigarette smoker. He is suing Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro, the brand that Williams smoked, for negligence and deceit.  A jury found that Williams' death was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smoking was safe. The jury ultimately found that Philip Morris negligent and had engaged in deceit. In respect to deceit, the claim at issue here, the jury awarded compensatory damages of about $821,000 along with $79.5 million in punitive damages.

The trial judge subsequently found the $79.5 million punitive damages award "excessive" and reduced it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled against Philip Morris, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.  The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the punitive damages. The Supreme Court remanded the decision and held that the punitive damages award was based in part on the jury's desire to punish the defendant for harming non-parties and amounted to a taking of property from the defendant without due process.  The Court did not reach the issue of whether the existing award was constitutionally “grossly excessive.”

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 549 U. S. 346 (2007).

  • United States
  • Feb 20, 2007
  • U.S. Supreme Court
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Parties

Plaintiff PHILIP MORRIS USA

Defendant Mayola Williams

Legislation Cited

The Constituion of the United States of America (Due Process Clause)

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"Respondent argues that she is free to show harm to other victims because it is relevant to a different part of the punitive damages constitutional equation, namely, reprehensibility. That is to say, harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct. Philip Morris, in turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order to demonstrate reprehensibility. Nor do we. Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible—although counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others nonetheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse. Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties. Given the risks of unfairness that we have mentioned, it is constitutionally important for a court to provide assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong one. And given the risks of arbitrariness, the concern for adequate notice, and the risk that punitive damages awards can, in practice, impose one State's (or one jury's) policies (e.g., banning cigarettes) upon other States—all of which accompany awards that, today, may be many times the size of such awards in the 18th and 19th centuries, see id., at 594-595, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (BREYER, J., concurring)—it is particularly important that States avoid procedure that unnecessarily deprives juries of proper legal guidance. We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused strangers."