Jesse Williams, represented by his widow, was a heavy cigarette smoker. He is suing Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro, the brand that Williams smoked, for negligence and deceit. A jury found that Williams' death was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smoking was safe. The jury ultimately found that Philip Morris negligent and had engaged in deceit. In respect to deceit, the claim at issue here, the jury awarded compensatory damages of about $821,000 along with $79.5 million in punitive damages.
The trial judge subsequently found the $79.5 million punitive damages award "excessive" and reduced it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled against Philip Morris, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the punitive damages. The Supreme Court remanded the decision and held that the punitive damages award was based in part on the jury's desire to punish the defendant for harming non-parties and amounted to a taking of property from the defendant without due process. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the existing award was constitutionally “grossly excessive.”
An individual or organization may seek civil damages against a tobacco company based on the claim that the use of tobacco products causes disease or death. Some of these cases will relate to general tobacco products, while others will relate to specific subcategories of tobacco products--for example, light or low products, menthol or other flavored products. Additionally, there may be cases relating to exposure to secondhand smoke.
A violation of the public’s right to information. The tobacco industry may claim that advertising, promotion or sponsorship, or packaging regulations limit the industry’s ability to communicate information to their customers and therefore infringes on the customer’s right to receive information, and to distinguish one product from another. Alternatively, public health advocates may claim that tobacco industry misinformation violates their right to accurate information or that government must be transparent in its dealings with the tobacco industry.
A violation of the right to procedural fairness. For example, a party may claim that a government agency did not consult with public or stakeholders when issuing regulations.
The court might consider procedural matters without touching the merits of the case. These might include: improper joinder, when third parties, such as Health NGOs or government officials, seek to become parties to the suit; lack of standing, where a plaintiff fails to meet the minimum requirements to bring suit; lack of personal jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction to rule over the defendant; or lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction over the issue at suit.
Jesse Williams, represented by his widow, was a heavy cigarette smoker. He is suing Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro, the brand that Williams smoked, for negligence and deceit. A jury found that Williams' death was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him to believe that smoking was safe. The jury ultimately found that Philip Morris negligent and had engaged in deceit. In respect to deceit, the claim at issue here, the jury awarded compensatory damages of about $821,000 along with $79.5 million in punitive damages.
The trial judge subsequently found the $79.5 million punitive damages award "excessive" and reduced it to $32 million. Both sides appealed. The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled against Philip Morris, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the punitive damages. The Supreme Court remanded the decision and held that the punitive damages award was based in part on the jury's desire to punish the defendant for harming non-parties and amounted to a taking of property from the defendant without due process. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the existing award was constitutionally “grossly excessive.”