National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., et al. v. City of Providence, Rhode Island, et al.
Various tobacco companies sought to prevent the implementation of ordinances passed by the City of Providence, Rhode Island to prohibit the sale of certain flavored non-cigarette tobacco products and certain price based promotions like “buy-two-get-one-free”. The court found that Providence’s restrictions are reasonable regulations of the sales of tobacco products and serve the city’s legitimate goal of reducing smoking and other tobacco use, especially among kids. The court rejected arguments by tobacco companies that the ordinances violated their First Amendment rights or are also preempted by federal and state law. Holding that, “Neither of the Ordinances at issue precludes the Plaintiffs from engaging in activities that can be considered ‘commercial speech’,” and “(t)he three provisions of the FSPTCA (Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act) constitute no impediment to the City’s prohibition against the sale of flavored tobacco products.”
National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc., et al. v. City of Providence, Rhode Island, et al., C.A. No. 12-96-ML (D.R.I. 2012).
United States
Dec 10, 2012
U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island
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"The definition of "characterizing flavor" also contains no explicit or implied prohibition against statements regarding the Plaintiffs' tobacco products; it merely serves to explain which tobacco products fall under the prohibition of Section 14-309. It also expressly exempts tobacco products with the distinguishable "taste or aroma of tobacco, menthol, mint or wintergreen," the sale of which is permissible under Section 14-309.
However, with respect to "concepts such as spicy, arctic, ice, cool, warm, hot mellow, fresh and breeze," the Court is of the opinion that the inclusion of this phrase serves to confuse rather than clarify the definition. Not only is it unexplained how a concept can relate to a tobacco product but, as the Plaintiffs correctly point out, it is at least conceivable that terms such as "arctic, ice, cool, and fresh" could be interpreted to include tobacco products flavored with menthol, mint or wintergreen, which are specifically excepted from the sales prohibition of Section 14-309. Therefore, in order to keep the Section 14-309 ban against the sale of flavored tobacco products intact, the provision "and concepts such as spicy, arctic, ice, cool, warm, hot, mellow, fresh, and breeze" shall be stricken from Section 14-308. See Section 14-307."
"With respect to the prohibition against the sale of flavored tobacco products (except in a smoking bar), the operative provision of the Flavor Ordinance, Section 14-309, is also directed at economic conduct that qualifies neither as "commercial speech" nor "expressive conduct." The Plaintiffs' argument is focused on Section 14-308, which defines "characterizing flavor" and "flavored tobacco product." Specifically, the Plaintiffs assert that (1) the Flavor Ordinance "presumptively bans products based on what Plaintiffs say about them," Pltfs.'s Mem. 26 (emphasis in original); (2) the Flavor Ordinance "prohibits any reference to an open-ended, non-exclusive list of 'concepts' or 'tastes or aromas' to describe tobacco products," id. at 26; and (3) such references render the Flavor Ordinance "unconstitutionally vague." Id. at 29-30.With respect to the first contention, the case offered by the Plaintiffs in support is distinguishable. In Virgina v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute which banned cross burning with intent to intimidate. However, the Court deemed unconstitutional a provision of the statute which provided that "[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons." Id. 538 U.S. at 364. The holding of the Court was based the Commonwealth's adoption of a model jury instruction which stated that "[t]he burning of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent." Id. ("The prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury instruction, renders the statute unconstitutional.") Because the provision permitted the Commonwealth to "arrest, prosecute, and convict a person based solely on the fact of cross burning itself," it allowed for the possibility that a person could be convicted for engaging in core political speech, without any intent of intimidation. Id. at 365. Section 14-309, which prohibits the sale of flavored tobacco products, except in a smoking bar, offers no possibility for creating "an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 365. It is an economic regulation of the sale of a particular product and, as such, it involves neither commercial speech nor expressive conduct. The inclusion of a "public claim or statement made by the manufacturer" to determine whether the described product falls under the definition of a "flavored
tobacco product" in Section 14-308 does not amount to a prohibition against speech. The sale of flavored tobacco products in Providence (outside a smoking bar) constitutes a violation of Section 14-309, Nat'l Ass'n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Providence (D.R.I., 2012), regardless of whether it is specifically described as a flavored tobacco product or not. In other words, the Plaintiffs are free to describe their products as having or producing a characterizing flavor; they are, however, precluded from selling flavored tobacco products in Providence (with the exception of tobacco bars)."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
Various tobacco companies sought to prevent the implementation of ordinances passed by the City of Providence, Rhode Island to prohibit the sale of certain flavored non-cigarette tobacco products and certain price based promotions like “buy-two-get-one-free”. The court found that Providence’s restrictions are reasonable regulations of the sales of tobacco products and serve the city’s legitimate goal of reducing smoking and other tobacco use, especially among kids. The court rejected arguments by tobacco companies that the ordinances violated their First Amendment rights or are also preempted by federal and state law. Holding that, “Neither of the Ordinances at issue precludes the Plaintiffs from engaging in activities that can be considered ‘commercial speech’,” and “(t)he three provisions of the FSPTCA (Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act) constitute no impediment to the City’s prohibition against the sale of flavored tobacco products.”