Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. French

After several named tobacco companies agreed to pay a class of non-smoking flight attendants for injuries suffered as a result of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke aboard Trans World Airlines flights, one plaintiff, Lynn French, refused the amount offered to her as settlement from Lorillard Tobacco Co. and sought a jury verdict instead. A jury eventually awarded French $5.5 million, and she subsequently filed a motion to receive compensation for her attorney fees and the costs she incurred after the judgment was made, along with the prejudgment interest on those costs. The Circuit Court of Miami-Dade County awarded French the costs. When the Tobacco company appealed, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, affirmed that French was entitled to the award of attorney's fees and costs, and moreover, that the prejudgment interest was available to her as of the time she received a jury judgment that was substantially higher than the tobacco company's settlement offer.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. French, 12 So.3d 786, District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District (2009).

  • United States
  • May 6, 2009
  • District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
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Parties

Plaintiff Lynn French

Defendant Lorillard Tobacco Company

Legislation Cited

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"The language in the rule and statute on settlement offers is clear that when the qualifying conditions have occurred ((1) a written offer has been made in accordance with Rule 1.442 and "an applicable Florida law", and (2) in the case of a plaintiff that is an offeror under section 768.79, the plaintiff "recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer"), then the offeror is "entitled" to the award of attorney's fees and costs. Rule 1.442(h)(1) merely grants a trial court the discretion to disallow such an award if it determines that "a proposal was not made in good faith." The use of the word "disallow" again connotes that the entitlement vests when the qualifying conditions have occurred. In this case, the qualifying conditions occurred in 2002. The years of further pleadings and arguments about the validity, sufficiency, or good faith of the offer and offeror did not result in any finding of "disentitlement" or "disapproval." If trial courts defer the accrual date for prejudgment interest until the date any issues pertaining to the validity or good faith of the offer are determined, that will incent the offerees/obligors to delay the day of resolution. Such a result is clearly contrary to both the spirit and the letter of the rule and the statute invoked in this case."