Independents Gas & Service Stations Association, Inc. v. City of Chicago

In December 2013, the Chicago City Council adopted an ordinance regulating the sale of flavored tobacco products near schools. Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance was preempted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and both a violation of vested rights and improperly retroactive under the Due Process Clause of the Illinois Constitution. (The Court considered two cases brought separately by Independents Gas and Quick Pick, as the complaints and the briefing on the motions to dismiss were the same.) The District Court dismissed all three of these challenges, finding that the FSPTCA had not preempted the ordinance; that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague; that no vested right was involved; and that the ordinance did not apply retroactively. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaints with prejudice and entered judgment in defendant's favor in both cases.

Independents Gas & Serv. Stations Associations, Inc. v. City of Chi., 112 F.Supp.3d 749 (N.D. Ill., 2015).

  • United States
  • Jun 29, 2015
  • U.S. District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
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Parties

Plaintiff

  • Independents Gas & Service Stations Associations, Inc.
  • Quick Pick Food Mart

Defendant City of Chicago

Legislation Cited

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Public Law 111-31, June 22, 2009

Chicago Municipal Code

Illinois Constitution

US Constitution

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"Plaintiffs note that section 387p(a)(2)(B) only applies to “requirements relating to the sale” of tobacco products, unlike section 387p(a)(1), which applies to “measure[s] relating to or prohibiting the sale” of tobacco products. 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(B), 387p(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, plaintiffs argue, because the ordinance prohibits the sale of flavored tobacco within 500 feet of a school, section 387p(a)(2)(B) does not apply. This argument is unpersuasive. The ordinance permits retail tobacco stores to sell flavored tobacco within 500 feet of a school; it also permits any retailer to sell flavored tobacco if located more than 500 feet from a school. Thus, the “sales restriction ... does not constitute a complete ban, as it permits the limited sale of flavored tobacco products....” U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 708 F.3d at 435–36. Requirements relating to sale will always prohibit sale under certain circumstances, namely when the requirements for sale are not met. Because flavored tobacco products may be sold within the city if the ordinance's requirements are met, the law does not constitute a prohibition in the meaning of the FSPTCA. See id. at 436 (“[G]iven Congress's explicit decision to preserve for the states a robust role in regulating, and even banning, sales of tobacco products, we adopt a broad reading of the saving clause and a limited view of the kinds of restrictions that would constitute a ban and require us to address the permissibility of [112 F.Supp.3d 754] outright prohibitions under the saving clause.”)."