After a smoker died of lung cancer, his survivors sued cigarette manufacturers and distributors. In this decision, the appellate court addressed the preemption issues in the context of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, which is invoked to achieve diversity jurisdiction. The court held that the lower court erroneously allowed the tobacco companies to achieve diversity jurisdiction by its incorrect finding that the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted and constituted fraudulent joinder. The court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to remand to state court.
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2009)
An individual or organization may seek civil damages against a tobacco company based on the claim that the use of tobacco products causes disease or death. Some of these cases will relate to general tobacco products, while others will relate to specific subcategories of tobacco products--for example, light or low products, menthol or other flavored products. Additionally, there may be cases relating to exposure to secondhand smoke.
The court might consider procedural matters without touching the merits of the case. These might include: improper joinder, when third parties, such as Health NGOs or government officials, seek to become parties to the suit; lack of standing, where a plaintiff fails to meet the minimum requirements to bring suit; lack of personal jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction to rule over the defendant; or lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction over the issue at suit.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"The Altria defendants' argument that Hunter's claim against ACC is impliedly preempted relies solely on the principle expressed in FDA that Congress has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products from the market. Unlike Geier, in which the state law claim would have imposed a duty that directly contradicted a federal regulation, Hunter's claim cannot be said to "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, Hunter's product liability claim does not present an obstacle to the congressional policy concerning the regulation of tobacco. In 2004, after the Court decided FDA, Congress repealed the provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 that had articulated federal policy in support of the marketing of tobacco. See Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-357, § 611(a); see also FDA, 529 U.S. at 137, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (quoting the now-repealed provision at length). The remaining regulatory provisions concern labeling, research, and education and do not provide strong evidence of a federal policy against more stringent state regulation. We decline to find preemption "in the absence of clear evidence of a conflict." Geier, 529 U.S. at 885, 120 S.Ct. 1913; see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69, 123 S.Ct. 518, 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002) (concluding that the Federal Boat Safety Act's express preemption clause did not cover state common law claims, and that "its structure and framework do not convey a clear and manifest intent to go even further and implicitly pre-empt all state common law relating to boat manufacture") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)."
"Here, for example, it is not obvious from the face of the complaint that Hunter has failed to state a claim against ACC. Hunter's complaint alleged: (1) that Francis "purchased and used cigarettes from defendants"; (2) the cigarettes were unsafe and defective and posed a risk that outweighed their utility; (3) Francis used defendants' cigarettes "without a change in condition," since they had left defendants' possession; (4) Francis developed lung cancer "as a direct and proximate result of the use of Defendants' unsafe and defective cigarettes"; and (5) this caused his family losses.2 In Alaska, "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human." Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963)). A plaintiff may claim strict products liability against a seller by proving that the product has a defect, that the defect causes an injury to a[582 F.3d 1046] human being, and that the defendant is a seller. Burnett v. Covell, 191 P.3d 985, 988 (Alaska 2008). Construing Hunter's pleadings liberally, as required by Alaska's notice pleading rules, the complaint sufficiently alleges a strict products liability claim under Alaska law. See Sykes v. Melba Creek Mining, Inc., 952 P.2d 1164, 1168 n. 4 (Alaska 1998) (explaining that "[a] cause of action is sufficiently pled if it provides the defendant with fair notice of the nature of the claim," and that pleadings should be construed "liberally (citing Alaska Ct. R. Civ. P. 8(a))). Because it is not obvious according to the settled rules of the state that Hunter has failed to state a claim against ACC, without looking to the federal law of preemption, we cannot find that the joinder was fraudulent."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
After a smoker died of lung cancer, his survivors sued cigarette manufacturers and distributors. In this decision, the appellate court addressed the preemption issues in the context of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, which is invoked to achieve diversity jurisdiction. The court held that the lower court erroneously allowed the tobacco companies to achieve diversity jurisdiction by its incorrect finding that the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted and constituted fraudulent joinder. The court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to remand to state court.