"Although the chapter of the Administrative Code of the City of New York in effect at the time did not have a provision limiting private causes of action, as Public Health Law § 1399-w does, no such private cause of action is specifically granted under the chapter. In any event, defendants 370 and Murray Hill have demonstrated that they are entitled to summary judgment on that portion of plaintiff's second cause of action because only two people occupied the suite of defendant Anderson. They both consented to smoking therein, and agreed that, if so, they would not violate any laws. Plaintiff's argument that the number of plaintiff's employees exceeded the limit of that Administrative Code of the City of New York provision misses the point. The material number of employees thereunder was the number who were employed in the office where the smoking was taking place, not the number in plaintiff's suite. Plaintiff has not shown that there is any question of fact as to that part of the second cause. of action, and thus, by this court's separate decision and order, that branch too has been dismissed as against defendants 370 and Murray Hill. Although defendant Anderson may be liable to plaintiff for a private nuisance (see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564, 569-570 [1977]), defendants 370 and Murray Hill are not. They did not create the smoke infiltration condition which plaintiff claims constituted a nuisance, and they gave up control of the premises to defendant Anderson by leasing possession thereof to him (see Bernard v, 345 E. 73rd Owners Corp., 181 AD2d at 544). Thus, the nuisance cause of action has been dismissed as against defendants 370 and Murray Hill."