Craft v. Philip Morris Companies

Plaintiff, individually and for a class of similarly situated smokers, originally filed this case as a class action against tobacco manufacturers.  Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants committed fraud by marketing “light” cigarettes in violation of the Merchandising Practices Act. Class was defined as "all residents of Missouri who purchased and consumed Defendants' Marlboro Lights cigarettes, in Missouri, at any time between the five years immediately preceding the filing of the Petition in this suit through the date the Court originally certified this suit as a class action (December 31, 2003), but who do not have a claim for personal injury resulting from the purchase or consumption of cigarettes." The district court granted class certification under the MPA. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, affirmed that decision. Subsequently, the plaintiff asked the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two, to return the case to Missouri's state court system based on a trend of federal courts sending relevant cases back to state courts due to the lack of timeliness of their original removal to federal courts. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two, granted the motion to return the case to the St. Louis City Circuit Court, where the case had originally commenced.

Craft v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., et al., No. 4:05CV01531 ERW, United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division (2006).

  • United States
  • Mar 17, 2006
  • United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division

Parties

Plaintiff Dayna Craft

Defendant

  • Others
  • Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

Legislation Cited

Merchandising Practices Act (Missouri)

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"The timeliness requirement...is extremely important because it protects state court jurisdiction and limits the “specter of impending interruption and a concomitant waste of judicial resources.” Johansen, 668 F.Supp. at 1297. This case has been actively litigated in state court for over five years. Plaintiff's motion for class certification was granted more than two years ago. The rigid construction of removal statutes is necessary for the efficient adjudication of cases like this one which already have a tendency to languish for years in the courts. Very substantial resources have been expended by the parties in state court. Plaintiff has a right to a reasonable expectation that her case will be timely heard in an orderly fashion. There is no lawful showing that this reasonable expectation should be interrupted by permitting removal. This Court holds that Watson II does not contain an “order” as contemplated by § 1446(b). Furthermore, there is no basis to conclude Watson II is “other paper” under § 1446(b). Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand will be granted."