Brown v. American Tobacco Company (In Re Tobacco II Cases)
A class of smokers in California filed an action against tobacco companies under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging that the companies' manipulated and concealed the content and addictiveness of nicotine in their products and deceived the public by disseminating misleading advertisements about the negative health effects of smoking. The defendants moved to decertify the class, arguing that the class members had failed to demonstrate injuries in fact to each member's personal property or money, as required for standing under the UCL. The Court held: (1) that class standing under the UCL required only named class members, not absent class members, to demonstrate injuries in fact; and (2) that satisfaction of the UCL's causation element required evidence of actual reliance on the campaign of misleading advertisements and statements, though reliance on particular advertisements or statements did not need to be pled nor proven to "an unrealistic degree of specificity."
In Re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 207 P.3d 20, Supreme Court of California (2009).
An individual or organization may seek civil damages against a tobacco company based on the claim that the use of tobacco products causes disease or death. Some of these cases will relate to general tobacco products, while others will relate to specific subcategories of tobacco products--for example, light or low products, menthol or other flavored products. Additionally, there may be cases relating to exposure to secondhand smoke.
Any violation of a law designed to ensure fair trade, competition, or the free flow of truthful information in the marketplace. For example, a government may require businesses to disclose detailed information about products—particularly in areas where safety or public health is an issue.
A claim of an infringement of any international trade agreement, including General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), or bilateral treaties.
The court might consider procedural matters without touching the merits of the case. These might include: improper joinder, when third parties, such as Health NGOs or government officials, seek to become parties to the suit; lack of standing, where a plaintiff fails to meet the minimum requirements to bring suit; lack of personal jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction to rule over the defendant; or lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction over the issue at suit.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"In each case, the plaintiffs testified that their decision to begin smoking was influenced and reinforced by cigarette advertising, though neither could point to specific advertisements. (Boeken, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 1662-1663; Whiteley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 679.) Each plaintiff also testified that, despite awareness of the controversy surrounding smoking, he or she believed the tobacco industry’s assurances that there was no definitive connection between cigarette smoking and various diseases. (Boeken, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1664-1665; Whiteley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 679.) Based on this record, the Boeken court concluded that there was substantial evidence that Boeken began to smoke “for reasons that track Philip Morris’s advertising of the time” (Boeken, at p. 1663), notwithstanding his inability to recall specific advertisements, that he relied on the defendant’s false statements regarding the health risks of cigarette
smoking notwithstanding his awareness of contrary statements, and that his reliance was justified. (Boeken at pp. 1664-1667.) Similarly, in Whiteley, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Whiteley’s justifiably relied on the defendant’s “false assurances and denials” regarding the hazard of smoking. (Whiteley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 679.) These decisions provide a framework for what plaintiffs must plead and prove in UCL fraud actions in terms of reliance. These cases teach that, while a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s misrepresentations were an immediate cause of the injury-causing conduct, the plaintiff is not required to allege that those misrepresentations were the sole or even the decisive cause of the injury-producing conduct. Furthermore, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges exposure to a long-term advertising campaign, the plaintiff is not required to plead with an unrealistic degree of specificity that the plaintiff relied on particular advertisements or statements. Finally, an allegation of reliance is not defeated merely because there was alternative information available to the consumer-plaintiff, even regarding an issue as prominent as whether cigarette smoking causes cancer. (See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 638 [there is no “special presumption under California law based on common knowledge that a plaintiff is aware that smoking is addictive or harmful”].) Accordingly, we conclude that a plaintiff must plead and prove actual reliance to satisfy the standing requirement of section 17204 but, consistent with the principles set forth above, is not required to necessarily plead and prove individualized reliance on specific misrepresentations or false statements where, as here, those misrepresentations and false statements were part of an extensive and long-term advertising campaign."
"The underlying claim in the instant case is that defendants have engaged in a long-term campaign of deceptive advertising and misrepresentations to the consumers of its products regarding the health risks of those products. The class, as certified, consists of members of the public who were exposed to defendants’ allegedly deceptive advertisements and misrepresentations and who were also
consumers of defendants’ products during a specific period of time. The nature of the claim is the same — the right to be protected against defendants’ alleged deceit — and the remedies remain the same — injunctive relief and restitution. Applying Proposition 64’s standing requirements to the class representative but not the absent class members enlarges neither the substantive rights nor the remedies of
the class. We therefore conclude that Proposition 64 was not intended to, and does not, impose section 17204’s standing requirements on absent class members in a UCL class action where class requirements have otherwise been found to exist."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
A class of smokers in California filed an action against tobacco companies under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging that the companies' manipulated and concealed the content and addictiveness of nicotine in their products and deceived the public by disseminating misleading advertisements about the negative health effects of smoking. The defendants moved to decertify the class, arguing that the class members had failed to demonstrate injuries in fact to each member's personal property or money, as required for standing under the UCL. The Court held: (1) that class standing under the UCL required only named class members, not absent class members, to demonstrate injuries in fact; and (2) that satisfaction of the UCL's causation element required evidence of actual reliance on the campaign of misleading advertisements and statements, though reliance on particular advertisements or statements did not need to be pled nor proven to "an unrealistic degree of specificity."