Bernice Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

Family members of smokers filed lawsuits against the major tobacco companies seeking damages for injuries caused by smoking. The family members argued that the findings in an earlier class action lawsuit (Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.) could be used against tobacco companies to prove that the companies had engaged in acts such as selling cigarettes that were defective and unreasonably dangerous. In this appeals court decision, the court ruled that the “approved findings” from the first phase of the Engle case must have some effect on future cases. However, the court ruled that the plaintiff in future cases must be able to establish that the jury in the Engle case actually decided that a tobacco company acted wrongfully regarding cigarettes that the plaintiff smoked.

Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir., 2010).

  • United States
  • Jul 22, 2010
  • U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Parties

Plaintiff

  • Alice Cothern as personal represenative of the estate of James A. Cothern
  • Alonzo Johnson as personal represenative of the estate of Willie P. Johnson
  • Bernice Brown as personal represenative of the estate of Levi Brown
  • Catherine Dillingham as personal represenative of the estate of Catherine Dillingham
  • Dorothy Copeland as personal represenative of the estate of Robert Copeland
  • Esther Werth as personal represenative of the estate of Howard Werth
  • Fonatine Wallace as personal represenative of the estate of Robert E. Wallace
  • Holly Murray as personal represenative of the estate of Perry Murray
  • James L. Smith, Sr. as personal represenative of the estate of Wanette Smith
  • Joanne Heflin-Gillis as personal represenative of the estate of Milton Heflin
  • Juanita Coston as personal represenative of the estate of Troy R. Coston
  • Lorraine Olson as personal represenative of the estate of Floyd G. Olson
  • Mary Jane Moschini as personal represenative of the estate of Giuliano P. Moschini
  • Minnie Register as personal represenative of the estate of Jimmy C. Register
  • Nadine Head as personal represenative of the estate of Carson W. Head
  • Paul Christie as personal represenative of the estate of Sharon Christie
  • Peggy Hickox as personal represenative of the estate of Benjamin F. Hickox
  • Robert Denton as personal represenative of the estate of Linda L. Denton
  • Sharon Fernandez as personal represenative of the estate of Sharon Fernandez
  • Tony Harris as personal represenative of the estate of Linda Harris

Defendant

  • Lorillard Tobacco Company
  • Lorillard, Inc.
  • Philip Morris USA, Inc.
  • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, individually and as successor by merger to the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the American Tobacco Company

Legislation Cited

Related Documents

Type of Litigation

Tobacco Control Topics

Substantive Issues

Type of Tobacco Product

None

"For example, Question 3 on the verdict form asked the jury: “Did one or more of the Defendant Tobacco Companies place cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous?” The jury answered “yes,” for every time period for every defendant except Brooke Group, Ltd., Inc.8 Under the defendants' view, the only fact that the jury found was that they sold some cigarette that was defective and unreasonably dangerous during the time periods listed on the verdict form. That would mean that the finding may not establish anything more specific; it may not establish, for instance, that any particular type or brand of cigarette sold by a defendant during the relevant time period was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Under the plaintiffs' broader view the jury's finding must mean that all cigarettes the defendants sold were defective and unreasonably dangerous because there is nothing to suggest that any type or brand of cigarette is any safer or less dangerous than any other type or brand. One problem with that argument is that the plaintiffs have pointed to nothing in the record, and there is certainly nothing in the jury findings themselves, to support their factual assertion.9Under Florida law the issue preclusion standard requires the asserting party to show with a “reasonable degree of certainty” that the specific factual issue was determined in its favor. See Seaboard, 260 So.2d at 864-65. The entire trial record may be considered for that purpose, although the burden is on the asserting party to point to specific parts of it to support its position, so long as those parts of the record combine to show to a reasonable degree of certainty that the jury made the specific factual determination that is being asserted. Nothing in the decisions we have read suggests that the inquiry may extend to matters outside the trial record, and it would not make sense to do so since the jury could not have appropriately considered anything outside the record."
"The Engle class came close to running the table-the jury answered “yes” to almost every question put to them. The jury found: (1) that smoking cigarettes causes 20 of 23 listed diseases or medical conditions; (2) that cigarettes containing nicotine are addictive or dependence producing; (3) that the defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (4) that the defendants made a false statement of a material fact, either knowing the statement was false or misleading, or being without knowledge as to its truth or falsity, with the intention of misleading smokers; (4a) that the defendants concealed or omitted material information, not otherwise known or available, knowing the material was false and misleading, or failed to disclose a material fact concerning or proving the health effects and/or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes; (5) that the defendants entered into an agreement to misrepresent information relating to the health effects of cigarette smoking, or the addictive nature of smoking cigarettes, with the intention that smokers and members of the public rely to their detriment; (5a) that the defendants entered into an agreement to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarette smoking, or the addictive nature of smoking cigarettes, with the intention that smokers and members of the public rely to their detriment; (6) that the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective in that they were not reasonably fit for the uses intended; (7) that the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to representations of fact made by the defendants either orally or in writing; (8) that the defendants failed to exercise the degree of care that a reasonable cigarette manufacturer would exercise under like circumstances; (9) that the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct or with reckless disregard relating to cigarettes sold to Florida smokers with the intent to inflict severe emotional distress; and (10) that the defendants' conduct rose to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement."