Two psychiatric patients and a nurse brought these proceedings against the Waitemata District Health Board (WDHB) challenging its Smoke-free Environment Policy which prohibited smoking in hospitals and surrounding grounds. The two patients were held in hospital under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act and were therefore unable to leave the hospital to smoke. The nurse was unable to leave the ward during her shift and was therefore unable to smoke during working hours. The applicants challenged the policy on traditional grounds of judicial review: illegality (including a failure to take into account relevant considerations); irrationality; and a breach of natural justice. They also alleged that the policy breached a number of rights under the Human Rights Act 1993 and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, including: unlawful discrimination against detained psychiatric patients compared to non-detained psychiatric patients; unlawful discrimination against smokers compared to non-smokers; unlawful discrimination on the ground of disability (because addiction to nicotine is a "disability"); the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment; and the right to respect private life.
The Court rejected all of the applicants' claims and upheld the validity of the Policy. The Court found that, given that smoking is a health hazard and that District Health Boards have a duty pursuant to their governing legislation to prevent or restrict health hazards, it was entirely within the powers vested in the WDHB to have policies to stop smoking. The Court rejected the applicants' claim that the Policy should provide for smoking places because the WDHB was entitled to take into account that such areas would impose additional costs, as well as the risks to passers-by posed by passive smoking. The potential harm to employees from passive smoking was a further justification for the policy given that the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 requires employers to provide and maintain a safe working environment for employees.
The Court distinguished this case from the situation in the prison cases(see: Taylor v Attorney General& Ors (3 July 2013)) on the basis that the relevant section of the Smoke-free Environments Act1990 relating to prisons assumed the existence of smoking within them; whereas, the section relating to hospitals made no such assumption.
The Court further found that there was no discrimination between detained psychiatric patients and non-detained psychiatric patients because all patients were treated alike. Further, there was no discrimination between non-smokers and smokers because nicotine addiction is not an "illness" or an "impairment" or a "disability" - while the applicants suffered some discomfort and distress, nicotine addiction is curable. Likewise, the Policy did not constitute "torture" because the withdrawal symptoms resulting from stopping smoking do not cross the relevant threshold of suffering, and the provision of NRTs to patients was humane and meaningful treatment for symptoms. The Policy also did not breach the right to respect private life contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because it was neither arbitrary nor unlawful, and in a hospital environment those who are in that environment have to accept limitations on their privacy.
Lastly, the Court found that, even if there had been a breach of the applicants' rights (which there had not), then the Policy was nonetheless justified because its purpose (to reduce smoking) was important in light of the damage that smoking does to persons and the community; the Policy was rationally connected to that purpose; and the Policy was proportionate and went no further than necessary to achieve its aims.
B et al. v. Waitemata District Health Board, CIV-2013-404-000351 [2013] NZHC 1702.
Tobacco companies or front groups may challenge any legislative or regulatory measure that affects their business interests. Unlike public interest litigation, these cases seek to weaken health measures. These cases frequently involve the industry proceeding against the government. For example, a group of restaurant owners challenging a smoke free law as unconstitutional.
A violation of the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health. Public health advocates may claim the public’s right to health is violated by weak tobacco control measures, industry tactics, or an organization’s or smokers’ actions.
A violation of the right to procedural fairness. For example, a party may claim that a government agency did not consult with public or stakeholders when issuing regulations.
A violation of the protection against cruel and unusual punishment. For example, prisoners may claim that exposure to secondhand smoke violates this right.
A claim against an employer involving a person who is harmed by secondhand smoke exposure in the workplace. For example, an employee with asthma may sue their employer for failing to protect them from exposure to secondhand smoke in the office or an employee with cancer may sue for workers’ compensation benefits. This may also include claims for workers' compensation. Disability laws also may protect customers who are not able to patronize a business filled with smoky air because of their disability.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"The threshold is high and quite plainly not crossed by the applicants’ case. There is no torture, as there is no deliberate infliction of mental or physical suffering. Nor is the ban imposed for a particular purpose such as obtaining information. Cruel treatment requires an element of the deliberate infliction of suffering, or which is particularly severe. The withdrawal symptoms resulting from the cessation of smoking tobacco do not, in my view, cross that threshold. I have referred to the consequences of nicotine addicts being unable to smoke.43 There is no debasement or humiliation of the person, and the treatment is not so out of proportion as to cause shock or revulsion. In Taunoa, only one of the claimants was found to have suffered from severe treatment prohibited by s 9, and that was in the context of severe solitary confinement over long periods to a person with a psychiatric illness.44 I do consider that the provision of nicotine replacement therapy by the WDHB, while not a panacea, is a humane and meaningful treatment of the symptoms of deprivation of nicotine to a smoker. That, and the other efforts that are 43 See [64]–[68]. 44 As held on appeal by the Court of Appeal, in findings undisturbed by the Supreme Court: Attorney-General v Taunoa [2006] 2 NZLR 457 (CA) at [212]–[226]. made to break the habit of smoking while not eradicating suffering, assuage any emotional or physical distress involved in the prohibiting of smoking."
"It is my assessment that while the applicants suffered discomfort and some distress as a consequence of not being able to smoke, and that this will be a frequent experience of nicotine addicts subject to the Smoke-free Policy who are unable to get out of hospital grounds, that this does not amount to an illness or impairment as defined. Nicotine addiction is curable and does not disrupt a person’s physical or psychological function to a sufficient degree to be accurately described under the Human Rights Act 1993 as a disability."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
Two psychiatric patients and a nurse brought these proceedings against the Waitemata District Health Board (WDHB) challenging its Smoke-free Environment Policy which prohibited smoking in hospitals and surrounding grounds. The two patients were held in hospital under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act and were therefore unable to leave the hospital to smoke. The nurse was unable to leave the ward during her shift and was therefore unable to smoke during working hours. The applicants challenged the policy on traditional grounds of judicial review: illegality (including a failure to take into account relevant considerations); irrationality; and a breach of natural justice. They also alleged that the policy breached a number of rights under the Human Rights Act 1993 and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, including: unlawful discrimination against detained psychiatric patients compared to non-detained psychiatric patients; unlawful discrimination against smokers compared to non-smokers; unlawful discrimination on the ground of disability (because addiction to nicotine is a "disability"); the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment; and the right to respect private life.
The Court rejected all of the applicants' claims and upheld the validity of the Policy. The Court found that, given that smoking is a health hazard and that District Health Boards have a duty pursuant to their governing legislation to prevent or restrict health hazards, it was entirely within the powers vested in the WDHB to have policies to stop smoking. The Court rejected the applicants' claim that the Policy should provide for smoking places because the WDHB was entitled to take into account that such areas would impose additional costs, as well as the risks to passers-by posed by passive smoking. The potential harm to employees from passive smoking was a further justification for the policy given that the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 requires employers to provide and maintain a safe working environment for employees.
The Court distinguished this case from the situation in the prison cases (see: Taylor v Attorney General & Ors (3 July 2013)) on the basis that the relevant section of the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990 relating to prisons assumed the existence of smoking within them; whereas, the section relating to hospitals made no such assumption.
The Court further found that there was no discrimination between detained psychiatric patients and non-detained psychiatric patients because all patients were treated alike. Further, there was no discrimination between non-smokers and smokers because nicotine addiction is not an "illness" or an "impairment" or a "disability" - while the applicants suffered some discomfort and distress, nicotine addiction is curable. Likewise, the Policy did not constitute "torture" because the withdrawal symptoms resulting from stopping smoking do not cross the relevant threshold of suffering, and the provision of NRTs to patients was humane and meaningful treatment for symptoms. The Policy also did not breach the right to respect private life contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because it was neither arbitrary nor unlawful, and in a hospital environment those who are in that environment have to accept limitations on their privacy.
Lastly, the Court found that, even if there had been a breach of the applicants' rights (which there had not), then the Policy was nonetheless justified because its purpose (to reduce smoking) was important in light of the damage that smoking does to persons and the community; the Policy was rationally connected to that purpose; and the Policy was proportionate and went no further than necessary to achieve its aims.