The plaintiff, a blind, diabetic prisoner, who had quit smoking after receiving surgery for a pituitary adenoma, claimed that prison officials and the State of Delaware Department of Corrections violated his right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, as guaranteed under the United States Constitution, by exposing him to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). According to the plaintiff, the exposure created serious medical needs and posed an unreasonable risk of harm to his health and safety. He therefore asserted that he was entitled to damages for present and future injuries. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that prison officials retaliated against him by using excessive force, including the use of physical violence, for filing the lawsuit. The defendants claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity for the ETS claims, as well as for the retaliation and excessive force claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a court could decide that the defendants violated the plaintiff's right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment by exposing him to an unreasonable risk of present and future harm. Insofar as the defendants potentially violated a clearly established fundamental right, they were not entitled to qualified immunity for either the ETS or retaliation claims. The Court of Appeals did not pass judgment on the actual objective or subjective elements of the plaintiff's ETS claims.
Atkinson v. Taylor, et al., 316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2003).
Some jurisdictions allow an individual or organization to initiate an action against another private party who is not following a particular law. For example, a person may sue a restaurant that allows smoking despite a smoke free law. If the plaintiff is claiming the violation of the law caused physical harm, this may also be a personal injury case.
An individual or organization may seek civil damages against a tobacco company based on the claim that the use of tobacco products causes disease or death. Some of these cases will relate to general tobacco products, while others will relate to specific subcategories of tobacco products--for example, light or low products, menthol or other flavored products. Additionally, there may be cases relating to exposure to secondhand smoke.
An individual or organization may sue their own government in order to advance or protect the public interest. For example, an NGO may sue the government claiming the government’s weak tobacco control laws violated their constitutional right to health.
A violation of the protection against cruel and unusual punishment. For example, prisoners may claim that exposure to secondhand smoke violates this right.
The court might consider procedural matters without touching the merits of the case. These might include: improper joinder, when third parties, such as Health NGOs or government officials, seek to become parties to the suit; lack of standing, where a plaintiff fails to meet the minimum requirements to bring suit; lack of personal jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction to rule over the defendant; or lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the court does not have jurisdiction over the issue at suit.
Type of Tobacco Product
None
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
"We cannot conclude that appellants are entitled to qualified immunity. Atkinson has fulfilled Saucier's first prong for denying qualified immunity by alleging a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. As both the Weaver and Alvarado Courts point out the Constitutional right alleged by Atkinson was established over two decades ago by the Supreme Court in Estelle. See Alvarado, 267 F.3dat 651; Weaver, 45 F.3d at 1256. Atkinson's amended complaint alleges that he was exposed, with deliberate indifference, to constant smoking in his cell for over seven months and as a result suffered nausea, an inability to eat, headaches, chest pains, difficulty breathing, numbness in his limbs, teary eyes, itching, burning skin, dizziness, a sore throat, coughing and production of sputum. The dissent describes these symptoms as "causing discomfort somewhere between that of hay fever and the common cold" and notes that "millions of people not in prison voluntarily tolerate similar levels of risk every day from second-hand smoke and numerous other sources." However, unlike individuals who voluntarily expose themselves to ETS, a prisoner cannot simply walk out of his cell whenever he wishes. When a susceptible prisoner is confined to a cell, a small and confined space, with a "constant" smoker for an extended period of time, such symptoms may transform what would otherwise be a passing annoyance into a serious ongoing medical need. Additionally, Atkinson has fulfilled the second prong of Saucier's test by demonstrating that the constitutional right was clearly established by the Hunt, Weaver and Estelle Courts on or before his own claim arose in 1998-1999. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 ("We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."); Weaver, 45 F.3d at 1256 (recognizing that severe headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, and breathing difficulties stemming from exposure to ETS constitutes a serious medical need, which requires removal of the prisoner from a smoking environment under the Eighth Amendment); Hunt, 974 F.2d at 735-36 (concluding prisoner could state a present injury claim for ETS exposure); see also Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 651-52 ("[Prisoner]'s complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that because of the prison officials' deliberate indifference, he was being exposed to levels of ETS which aggravated his chronic asthma, thereby endangering his existing health, a claim recognized as an Eighth Amendment violation twenty-five years ago in Estelle v. Gamble ...."). Moreover, Dr. Rizzo, an examining physician, has concluded that these symptoms possibly were precipitated by Atkinson's exposure to ETS. The District Court found that deliberate indifference to these alleged symptoms constituted a violation of clearly established law, and we agree. Atkinson alleges that when he tried to seek help at the prison infirmary the treating nurse responded that she was unable to transfer him to a cell with a nonsmoking roommate. Similarly, Atkinson has produced evidence that after telling prison officials about his sensitivity to ETS no change was made in housing conditions. This evidence demonstrates deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 ("[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety....")."
Limitations regarding the use of quotes The quotes provided here reflect statements from a specific decision. Accordingly, the International Legal Consortium (ILC) cannot guarantee that an appellate court has not reversed a lower court decision which may influence the applicability or influence of a given quote. All quotes have been selected based on the subjective evaluations undertaken by the ILC meaning that quotes provided here may not accurately or comprehensively represent a given court’s opinion or conclusion, as such quotes may have originally appeared alongside other negative opinions or accompanying facts. Further, some quotes are derived from unofficial English translations, which may alter their original meaning. We emphasize the need to review the original decision and related decisions before authoritatively relying on quotes. Using quotes provided here should not be construed as legal advice and is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter in any jurisdiction. Please see the full limitations at https://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/about.
The plaintiff, a blind, diabetic prisoner, who had quit smoking after receiving surgery for a pituitary adenoma, claimed that prison officials and the State of Delaware Department of Corrections violated his right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, as guaranteed under the United States Constitution, by exposing him to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). According to the plaintiff, the exposure created serious medical needs and posed an unreasonable risk of harm to his health and safety. He therefore asserted that he was entitled to damages for present and future injuries. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that prison officials retaliated against him by using excessive force, including the use of physical violence, for filing the lawsuit. The defendants claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity for the ETS claims, as well as for the retaliation and excessive force claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a court could decide that the defendants violated the plaintiff's right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment by exposing him to an unreasonable risk of present and future harm. Insofar as the defendants potentially violated a clearly established fundamental right, they were not entitled to qualified immunity for either the ETS or retaliation claims. The Court of Appeals did not pass judgment on the actual objective or subjective elements of the plaintiff's ETS claims.