

<http://www.avvocatinovara.com/il-tribunale-di-roma-smentisce-la-corte-d-appello-sulla-risarcibilita-dei-danni-da-sigaretta/>

## Civil

Saturday, April 23, 2005

### The Court of Rome denies the Court of 'Appeals on the refundability of the damage from cigarettes.

The Court of Rome denies the Court of Appeal on the refundability of the damage "cigarette".

Court of Rome - Section

Thirteenth - April 4, 2005 judgment

Single Judge Rossetti

Conduct of case

In a writ

properly served, Anita Tonutto, John and Albert Agostinis Agostinis agreed before this Tribunal ETI Spa.

The actors exhibited in fact that:

- Were, respectively, wife and children of Mr. Agostinis Louis, died October 28, 2001 due to a lung cancer;

- The late Louis Agostinis was born in 1938, and had started smoking at the age of 18;

- He always smoked cigarettes brand "MS", marketed by the defendant and by his predecessors;

- The tumor that had caused the death of Mr. Louis Agostinis was in turn caused by smoking.

Appended, then, that in iure

the death of Mr. Louis Agostinis had to answer the defendant institution, under

two respects:

a) is in accordance with Article 2050 CC;

b) in any case, for fault

tort under Article 2043 CC, to have failed until 1991 to inform consumers of the dangers of using tobacco.

The Eti Spa is constituted

regularly, pleading:

- Due to lack of

sued, to be set up only in 1998, while the culpable events ascribed to it by the actors (ie information omitted) were maintained for up to 1990;

- Limitation of rights

operated by the actors jure haereditatis;

- The substance is unfounded of the application.

With the notes in accordance with Article 180, paragraph 2, CPC, ETI sought and was granted after expiration of time

ex Article 184bis CPC, to be allowed to call into question the Ministry of Economy

Company and the State Monopoly, who asked to be held harmless in the event that the plaintiff's claim.

The two institutions are called upon

formed regularly, also objecting due to lack of

sued and, in this respect, the invalidity

the main question.

In the course of education were acquired documents.

Exhausted education and specified

the findings, the case was adjourned for judgment at the hearing on 22

November 2004.

### Reasons for Decision

1. The objection of lack of

legal status of actors must be rejected in

As impermissibly raised only in the closing statement.

How, then, according to the survey

that the matter would be detectable ex officio, it should be borne in mind in this regard

which, as repeatedly held by the SC, the fact that Article 167, paragraph

1, CPC, requiring the defendant to take a position

A response on the facts placed by the plaintiff on the basis of the question,

show the existence of a general principle that the failure to object

the adverse allegations has to be considered proven fact is not disputed,

with no possibility for the judge

of

go to the opposite opinion (761/02 Supreme Court, Supreme Court

10031/04, in "D & G"

26/2004 p. 33). Therefore, being late on the challenge legal status of actors, the latter must be considered permissible.

2. The objection of lack of

sued (sic, not ownership of the passive side of the obligation for compensation) raised by ETI is unfounded.

The actors attached to foundation

his claim that the illegality of a conduct (failure to provide information about the dangers of tobacco products) held until 1991.

The illegal conduct, according to the

prospettazione plaintiff was therefore required by the Administration Autonomous Administration of State Monopolies.

The ETI was established by Legislative Decree 283/98, Article 3, paragraph 1, has provided

"The body is the owner of the assets and liabilities, and the rights and property

pertaining to the production and commercial activities have been allocated to the Administration

Autonomous Administration of State Monopolies. "

From the syntax of this rule,

clear and unambiguous, it is clear that:

a) ETI is by law "holds

expense reports, "that is owed;

b) these debts are those

"Pertaining to the production and business activities," the company Monopolies

State, namely the obligations arising from the activity of

production and sale of tobacco products. And they do not have to read any further distinction, it would be futile to expect

separate debts negotiating from those of a tort;

c) finally, the most important point, the

these liabilities borne by the ETI are those relating to

activity "already" assigned to the Company Monopoly. The use of the adverb "already" makes

clear that the legislature has provided for the assignment of debts to ETI

existing monopolies and imposed on the Company upon incorporation

Eti, and therefore a possibility of liberating assumption

under the law of debt. Consider that, arguing otherwise, the

provision in question would be completely useless, being obvious that the debts incurred in the performance of the production and

sale of smoking products, starting from the moment of formation of the Eti,

would already be burdened naturally thereon, without the need for a

standard  
that he said so explicitly. And as between two conflicting interpretations  
must be able to confer the preferred sense and utility to the standard  
rather than be able to cancel the meaning, it must be concluded that  
all debts arising in the abstract  
the activity of dealing or tort Company is the State Monopoly  
required to meet the ETI, according to the mentioned article 3 of  
Legislative Decree 283/98.

2.1. Are irrelevant to  
respect, the allegations carried out in this regard by  
the defendant.

With regard to the alleged  
"Officious relief" of the existence of ETI sued former  
Article 3 of Legislative Decree 283/98, just remember that it  
is a mere application of the principle *iura novelti curia*.

As regards  
all'allegazione that the ETI could not possibly  
be held responsible for the illegal act committed by the Company  
Monopoly  
because in this case would not have occurred in a sequence  
universum jus Eti Company Monopoly, it is not decisive.

Even if, in fact, you want to exclude in this case a phenomenon of  
succession

(Statement, this, in theory acceptable, provided that the Company  
Monopoly

was not suppressed: see. for the establishment of a  
similar principle, the Supreme Court, Section One, 7258/01, in Foro it.,  
2003, I,

56), there is to be observed that the transfer of debts (also from the  
fact

illegal) from one subject to another well can be placed by the  
legislature,

in the exercise of its discretion, even if it is not a  
succession genuine. And since, as we have seen, in this case the  
transfer derives from the only possible interpretation of Article 3 of  
Legislative Decree 283/98, states that nothing in the present case can  
not

stricti juris talk to a real phenomenon of succession, as  
however, an assumption can be configured

liberating provided by law. There is only to add, to the foregoing, as  
the conclusions reached just are not contradicted by previous invoked  
the defendant (represented by the Supreme Court, Section Two,  
7381/01,

in Foro it. Rep. 2001, Civil Damages, no. 121).

In that case, in fact,

only the principle invoked by ETI is a mere obiter, although massimato unexpectedly high and so apparently regula iuris of the decision, but - what matters most - the case decided by the SC concerned a routine event of the transfer of an undertaking, subject

to the provisions of Article 2560 CC, and not a transfer of debits and credits provided for, as has been the case Eti, by law.

3. On the merits, the Court finds that

The facts enclosed by the actors has often been decided by this Court, again speaking reiettivo the claim (Court Rome, 11 February 2000, Courier swore., 2000, 1639;

Court Rome, April 4, 1997, in Damage and resp., 1997, 750).

From these decisions there is no reason to depart, for the reasons that follow.

4. It must, in the first place,

possible that in this case the actors can invoke the presumption of Article 2050 CC.

This is for three independent reasons.

4.1. The first reason is that

the possibility provided for in Article 2050 CC (responsible for the operation of dangerous activity) does not constitute a case of liability, but simply a rebuttable presumption of guilt (formerly plurimis, the Supreme Court, Section Three, 10382/02). As a result, it will release

victim of the damage from the proof of fault or willful misconduct of the tortfeasor, but not

that of the causal link between the damage suffered and the dangerous activity (ex

plurimis, the Supreme Court, Section Three, 4792/01).

Causation

that in the present case, as will be better explained later, is completely missing.

4.2. The second is that in any case in the present case does not meet the requirements for

the application of Article 2050 CC.

The provision in question does in fact refer to the "dangerous activities", and not

to mere "led" Dangerous occur when the first activity

present a significant potential for harm to others, and nothing detects whether

activity, normally harmless, becomes dangerous for the conduct of those who

exercises. Thus, for purposes of Article 2050 CC, it is not significant conduct merely subjective dangerous, capable of rendering the

liability only in accordance with the rule of Article 2043 CC (Supreme Court

15334/04; The Supreme Court, Section Two, 13530/92).

In the present case, were

the same actors to attach the damage was caused from the omission of information

about the risks of smoking: they therefore ascribe to the defendant's conduct, and not an activity, dangerous, and consequently inapplicable Section 2050 Cc.

4.3. The third reason is that the

production and sale of cigarettes can not

considered dangerous activity, in the sense of Article 2050 CC.

The rule just

remembered specifies two criteria by which to evaluate the hazardous nature or

less activity, which resulted in the damage: the intrinsic nature of such activities, or the quality of the means used. The presumption in

Article under review therefore applies both to the activities objectively dangerous, both to those who, although not inherently dangerous,

may become so in consequence of the particular type of

instruments adopted by the operator. According to the SC, are assets dangerous within the meaning of Section 2050 Cc not just those that

are

qualified by law to public safety and other special laws, but

even those that by their very nature or characteristics of the means

used resulting in a significant possibility of harm to

their strong offensive potential, and whether in practice

activity is to be considered dangerous is

task of the trial court whose decision is final evaluation in the

legitimacy if properly motivated (the Supreme Court, Section Three, 5341/98).

In the light of these criteria is

easy to detect that the production and sale of cigarettes:

a) has not inherently

dangerous, because the danger can only arise from the use immoderate that

of these products is made;

b) does not use dangerous means,

because the equipment used for packaging and marketing do not present

any special or potential harmful.

Added that the SC has expressly ruled that the dangerousness of an activity can be assessed reference to the spread of the mode with which is commonly exercised. A certain activities, therefore, can not be held "dangerous" simply because those who practice it usually does not take the precautions that would appropriate, since this would assume parameter in the evaluation not already in the attitude of harm, but the degree of care commonly found (Supreme Court, 7916/04). This regula iuris is perfectly suited to the case in which the players allege that the source of damage was not to the activities of the defendant Former regarded itself, but the omission of an adequate and Full information on the dangers of smoking.

5. Neither the Eti responsibility may be invoked under Article 2043 CC. Compared to the constructability of a tort tort Eti, for failure to provide information consumers about the dangers of smoking, missing first place in this case a good causal link. The finding of a causal link between the conduct of omission (Such as that ascribed by the plaintiff to today defendant) and the event of damage is governed by Articles 40 and 41 Cp, which pose a rule (the equivalence causal tempered) pervasive the whole system (ex permultis, the Supreme Court, Section Three, 5962/00, in Arch. Circolaz., 2000, 840), and therefore also applicable in the field of illicit Civil (with respect to which the provisions of section 1223 CC, on the other hand, discipline a very different causation, namely that between harmful event and harmful consequences: cfr., ex multis, the Supreme Court, Section Three, 16163/01, in Foro it. Rep., 2001, Social responsibility, no. 162). In the interpretation of the Articles 40 and 41 Cp, and with special reference to the case of delictum for omissionem commissum, the SC has recently abandoned its traditional

orientation, according to which in case of failure negligent, the author is responsible for the damage many times the conduct alternative

correct would have "serious and significant opportunities" to avoid the damage

(In this sense, *ex multis*, the Supreme Court, Section Four, Minella, the Supreme Court, Section Four, October 5, 2000, in Riv. Pen., 2001, 452; The Supreme Court, Section Four, 1 October 1999, Dir. Pen. and proc., 2001, 469).

Indeed

the Joint Sections of the criminal court of appeal, composing the contrast

meanwhile arisen within the simple sections, have abandoned the old notion of "serious and significant opportunity" to avoid the event, and

against sanctioned by the obligation to have recourse to several logical criteria of

proof of causation, which can be summarized as follows:

a) as regards

to the establishment of a causal link between the failure and damage, remains valid application to the "counterfactual judgment," or that particular abstraction consists in assuming what were the consequences of the failure to conduct proper alternative manager;

b) with regard to the degree of

probability, according to which abstractly determine if the execution of the

failure to conduct would have prevented the damage, it is necessary to have regard not to the

mere "statistical probability", but at different

concept of "logical probability", which must be close to certainty;

c) the "logical probability", in

time, to be determined by collating the statistical probability of success failure to conduct with all the circumstances of the case, as they appear

from the evidence collected (Supreme Court, On 30328/02, in "D & G" n. 35 p. 21, and especially p. 26-27). A

criterion of "series and appreciable chance of success", therefore, is

came to replace that of "high or high credibility

rational "judgment counterfactual (so, for the law of this

Court, Civil Court. Rome 24.1.2004, Silvestri c. St. John's Hospital, unpublished;

Trib. Rome 3.12.2003, Mattresses c. Ventrlicelli, unpublished; Trib. Rome 22.7.2003,



New Year c. Hospital S. Giovanni-Addolorata, unpublished).

5.2. All this being the case in law,  
is detected in fact the obligation to affix on the packaging of  
cigarettes, a  
warning about the dangers of smoking was introduced  
Article 46 of Law 428/90 (standard today, however, repealed by Article  
11  
paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree 184/03).

It is therefore evident that the conduct  
illicit actors ascribed to the defendant ceased  
in 1991. However, the same actors are attached to a spouse who is  
died prematurely in 2000. Why, then, be taken to exist a  
valid causal connection between the omission imputed to the  
defendant and the death of  
Mr Agostinis, it is necessary to say that if prior to 1991 on  
packs of cigarettes had been inscribed the words "smoking is harmful  
to  
health "(that the content of the obligation introduced in 1991), Mr.  
Agostinis  
would not have contracted cancer, "with high or high credibility  
rational. "

This finding is evidence  
unsustainable.

Lung cancer can not,  
unanimously considered as medical science, have a latency period  
asymptomatic for ten years (many of them have passed between the  
end of  
negligent omission and the damage event).

Authoritative and international

Clinical studies have shown that in patients who are  
made early diagnosis of lung cancer, the survival at five  
years is 50%, a percentage which may reach 85% in case it is possible  
oncologically correct resection surgical intervention  
(Pasquotti, Characteristics and clinical manifestations of tumors of the  
Respiratory, Oncology Referral Centre IRCCS, Aviano, 2002). E 'was  
also

found that in 2002, the average survival rate of patients with cancer  
Lung cancer not undergoing treatment was 4-5 months, with a  
average rate at 1 year of 10%. By contrast, in the same year, the rate  
of

median survival of patients with lung cancer  
metastatic subjected to treatment was approximately 8  
months, with an average rate of 33% at 1 year (Rombolà, Lung cancer

-

Primary and secondary prevention, Humanitas-Gavazzeni Bergamo, 2003).

Therefore, the disease that led to

Mr. death. Agostinis necessarily revolted after

1991, and then after that the conduct was negligent omission ceased.

And since

Mr. Agostinis for admission of the same players, had continued to smoking after the introduction of the warnings marked on the packaging

cigarettes, can not prevail "with high or high credibility

rational "that if these

been provided even before 1991, he would quit smoking and not

would contract the disease.

It is worth adding that,

according to the authoritative Guidelines developed dall'Aiom (Italian Association

of Medical Oncology) "for those who quit smoking the

risk [of lung cancer] is progressively reduced over the 10-15

the following years, with latencies greater than ever at the age of interruption

habit "(various authors, Guidelines for thoraco-pulmonary neoplasms, Aiom,

Brescia 2003). So even want to admit that Mr. Agostinis would

quit smoking as soon as he was introduced warning stamped

packages, the fact remains that the disease is

however arising ten years later by the moment, and since, as soon as

mentioned, the risk of cancer decreases with the increase of the period of time

elapsed since the cessation of cigarette smoking, in this case the possibility

that the disease was not contracted in case of adequate information

could not possibly be "high or high," according to the dictum of the Supreme Court

30328/02, t ..

6. As mentioned, in addition to

absolute lack of causation, in this case there is no blame

legally relevant entity defendant. Or, rather, it could

also exist, but it would be absorbed by the

blame the victim, pursuant to Article 1227 CC.

6.1. That

cigarette smoking is harmful to health and can cause cancer, should

considered a common notion, widespread, well-known and obvious as handheld

many years.

As early as

The nineteenth century, medical science clearly ascertained that pipe smokers

showed frequent tumors of the lower lip, tongue and the oral cavity. At first, the carcinogenic effect was attributed more to the heat of the pipe than to the products of burning of tobacco. In a second time it was suggested that respiratory diseases and lung cancer were due to cigarette smoking.

In particular, already in 1836, some

Scientists admitted bluntly that "tobacco is a poison"

("Thousands and tens of Thousands die of diseases of the lungs

Generally

brought on by tobacco smoking (...); How is it possible to be otherwise? Tobacco is a poison. A man will die

of an infusion of tobacco as of a shot through the head "; so Green, New

England Almanack and Farmer's Friend (1836).

In 1845,

some German physiologists ascertained that on a sample of twenty deaths among

18 and 35, 10 were caused by smoking (as Benjamin I. Lane, The Mysteries of Tobacco, New York, Wiley and Putnam, 1845

pp. 131-132).

In 1876, Dr. Hippolyte A. Depierris (1810-1889) was asked in the form of rhetoric, "the tabac, here contient le plus violent des poisons, the nicotine

abrégé-t-il's existence? East-the causes of the dégénérescence physique et moral

des sociétés modernes? "(Depierris, Physiologie

Social, Paris, Dentu, 1876).

Alarms and recommendations

analogues are found in numerous scientific papers published between late nineteenth and early twentieth century. (Meta Lander, The Tobacco Problem, Boston, Lee

and Shepard, 1882, p. 55; Bruce Fink, Tobacco, Cincinnati, The Abingdon Press,

1915, p 30; John Kellogg, Tobaccoism, or, How Tobacco Kills, Battle Creek, The

Modern Medicine Publishing Co., 1922, p. 118). Not surprisingly, in 1908

England was introduced a law prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to children under 16 years.

In the early 1900s he set

report the association between smoking and vascular disease. Regarding the myocardial infarction, already starting from 1912 accumulated evidence on its association with smoking; data collected by the prof. Inglese indicated an increased risk of 2-4 times, especially among the 40 and 60 years.

In 1938, the journal Science published the results of a study carried out by Professor. Raymond Pearl, the Johns Hopkins University. This study is still very well-known because it was the first that exposed irrefutable results. After reviewing 6,813 patients, the author concluded that 45% of smokers living in the media up to 60 years, compared with 65% of non-smokers. The dr. Pearl, in the conclusion of his work, he wrote: "Smoking tobacco shortens life, in proportion the number of cigarettes smoked daily. "

In the 50s and 60s these data, well-known in the scientific world, became known to the politicians and the mass public. In the annual report of the Surgeon General (maximum US health authorities) of 1964, reads, "cigarette smoking contributes substantially to mortality in due to specific diseases and the overall death rate. "

Even in Italy, in the 70s the fact that inhaling smoke is harmful health, does cause cancer, could be considered a matter of common experience. Advertising campaigns launched by non-profit organizations

launched in those years, warnings of some resonance ("Smokers also poisons

you, tell him to stop! "), and it is significant that already Law 584/75 was introduced

Italy's ban on smoking in public places. It is not superfluous add that such a law could not make the perceived opinion public about the risks of smoking, since the ratio of it could not be regarded, even for the most inexperienced of citizens, in order to keep the public places clean from cigarette butts and cigarette butts.

It must therefore be concluded that:

a) the fact that the smoke cigarettes is harmful to health is a socially well-known fact;

b) awareness of the social fact is well before 1990.

6.2. In light of the foregoing, it is easy to conclude that one of two things:

a) or Mr. Agostinis well knew the harmfulness of smoking, and then continuing to smoke has accepted the risk

the consequences of such conduct, so that the damage that is derivative is not compensable, under Article 1227, paragraph 1, CC;

b) or was not aware of such harmfulness: and also in this case, having the victim a notion that has long ignored could be considered elementary and communis

omnium, the damage is not compensable, under Article 1227, paragraph 1, CC.

It is worth adding, with

with regard to this profile, as there may be shared the view put forward by the plaintiff - not openly expressed, but

clearly deduced from all the reasons given - that reporting requirements imposed on the producer or the seller of consumer products would extend up to encompass circumstances clearly fall within the wealth of knowledge just the average man.

Indeed

each individual, especially in light of the general duty of solidarity that Article 2 of the Constitution, shall be required to fulfill the "mandatory duties

social solidarity ', among which also falls to accept the foreseen or foreseeable consequences of their actions peacefully. Say otherwise, the one who keeps a negligent conduct, not taking precautions minimum of prudence and very well known, it can then

complain of not being informed, as

the harmfulness of smoking was a mysterious and unspoken mystery known only to

very few.

7. The conclusions so far

exposed, in the opinion of this Court, do not deserve to be magazines, not even after the difference of opinion recently adopted by the Court appeal

Rome 1015/05, unpublished.

In fact, this Court, having carefully considered the arguments cited by the Court Capitoline believes, however, that they can not be

shared.

The Court of Appeal has based its decision to sentence (in that case, the company was Monopoly) on two independent arguments: first, that the fault of the manufacturer Tobacco, in the case of the death of a smoker for lung cancer, it is assumed ex

Article 2050 CC; the other, however that the producer-seller was at fault for not having informed the buyer with the health risks of smoking.

#### 7.1. The inapplicability

in this case the presumption referred to in Article 2050 CC has already been said

above, §§ 4 et seq., and therefore may here refer to the paragraph.

It only needs to be added as

does not appear apt parallel established by the Court

Appeals from the production of cigarettes and that of blood products, gamma globulin or blood transfusion (activities, the latter considered by court rulings hazardous under Article 2050 CC).

It is in fact

easy to detect, especially with regard to the production and distribution of

blood products than to that of plasma for transfusion, that:

a) whether this Court, and the

the same Court of Appeal, called to assess the applicability or less Section 2050 cc in such activities, desunsero the dangerous nature of these from a complex "blocking legislation", composed by rules of the law and regulations governing carefully over the cycle production and distribution of such substances: then, therefore, it was thought that

the very existence of such rules would make clear that the legislature itself

had considered "dangerous" the corresponding activity, since otherwise

would have covered every detail with all provisions vaults to protect the health of patients (Rome Court November 27, 1998, in *Giurispr. Roman*, 1999, 169; *Trib. Rome* June 4, 2001, *ibid*, 2001, 301;

*App. Rome*, 23 October 2000 in *damage and resp.*, 2001, 1067). A block regulatory

similar vainly seek in this case; the technical aspects of

production and distribution of cigarettes are not

indeed manned by ad hoc rules, except for the information

the harmfulness of smoking, as we have seen only introduced in 1990;

b) the damage potential

arrecabile from a blood product is damage from infection: therefore,

on the one hand, a damage is not connected to the "product" itself, but caused by the onset of this a pathogen; on the other hand, an injury which does not require the use of all or abuse that is made of the substance. Also intake once and a small dose of a drug infected blood product can cause serious illness. It is evident that the production of blood products and that of cigarettes are not comparable, in terms of the nature of the activity and of the means used; c) finally, while contact with a blood product infected undoubtedly generate a loss, use or misuse of smoking generate probably, but not certainly, damage to health: even under This third part, therefore, it is incorrect to extrapolate the regulae juris minted in the event of damage from infected blood products, to apply sic and simply that of smoke damage.

7.2. How much, then the claim that ETI would be at fault for not having duly informed buyers on the harmful effects of cigarette smoke, the following is observed. Blame civil consists of an alteration: laws, regulations, orders, discipline, rules contractual rules of common prudence, leges artis. To determine, therefore, whether a conduct is negligent or not, you should consider whether it is or is not "deviant" compared to a rule, the type of those just indicated.

In this case, it is undisputed that there were no legal or contractual, before 1990, impose an obligation to inform the manufacturer the purchaser of the dangers of smoking. It is therefore necessary to determine whether, omitting the information, the Company Monopoly and it's Eti, has failed to fulfill the rules of common prudence.

7.3. That the Company Monopoly until 1990, has failed to fulfill a rule of common caution must be excluded.

It is well-known and indisputable that smoking is harmful in case of repeated or excessive. It is the abuti, not the usefulness, it is harmful not seriously be challenged

that has little chance of getting lung cancer who smoke a cigarette per month.

Well, activities or substances

which, if repeated frequently assumed or may be harmful to health, are

Unfortunately endless, so the abuse of the personal computer is harmful to the eye,

the alcohol to the liver functions, that of the fat cholesterol,

to the sugar glucose, prolonged exposure to sunlight

harmful to the skin, and the excessive laziness sinanche

harm to the circulatory system.

Support, then, that the

manufacturer of a substance or of a res that can

harmful if taken in massive quantities, is kept if the former, ie in the absence of

a rule that imposes, to inform

the user of such dangers, is an argument that proves too much, why

no one has even speculated that the only PC makers to

low vision, or to rotisserie and pastry for diseases

cardiovascular or diabetes, or the manufacturers of sofas and armchairs

damage caused by obesity.

The obvious reductio ad absurdum

test the fallacy of the premise, namely that the

manufacturer of a substance which is not pernicious former if, but only for use

excessive that it is made, is under no obligation to inform

the buyer, especially when the dangers arising from the abuse of it

fall peacefully in his wealth of knowledge of the average man.

8. In

Finally, the absence in this case is to blame, it is the causal link, the question as formulated must be rejected.

9. The costs of these proceedings

by the losing party and you dismiss it as in the device.

In the relationship between ETI and the Ams

costs must be set against the first, taking into account the principle of so-called

Virtual unsuccessful. In fact, if the ETI was

was sentenced, the demand for indemnity was rejected, on the grounds

as stated above, §§ 4 ff ..

PQM



the

Court, finally saying, hereby orders as follows:

- Reject the application as proposed by Anita Tonutto, John Agostinis, Alberto Agostinis against Eti Spa;

- Anita Tonutto sentence, John Agostinis, Alberto Agostinis jointly recast in favor of Eti Spa of the costs of these proceedings, which dismiss at € 100 for expenses; € 1,000 for rights attorney; EUR 1,500 for attorney's fees, for a total of € 2,600, plus overhead Article 14 DM 127/04, Tax and CPA;

- Declares consumption demand as proposed by Eti Spa in respect of the Ministry of Economy and Administration

Autonomous Administration of State Monopolies;

- Eti sentence Spa recast in favor of the Ministry of Economy and Administration Autonomous Administration of State Monopolies, jointly and severally, the costs of these proceedings, you settle in for € 50 costs; € 800 for rights attorney; € 1,200 for attorney's fees, for a total of € 2050 over overheads by article 14 of Ministerial Decree 127/04, Tax and CPA.